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ABSTRACT
Game theory is a popular tool for designing interaction protocols
for agent systems. It is currently not clear how to apply this to open
agent systems. By “open” we mean that foreign agents will be free
enter and leave different agent systems at will. This means that
agents will need to be able to work with previously unseen proto-
cols. There does not yet exist any agreement on a standard way in
which such protocols can be speciﬁed and published. Furthermore,
it is not clear how an agent could be given the ability to use an ar-
bitrary published protocol; the agent would need to be able to work
out a strategy for participation. To address this we propose a ma-
chine readable language in which a game theory mechanism can be
written in the form of a program. Enabling agents to automatically
determine the game theoretic properties of an arbitrary game is dif-
ﬁcult. Rather than requiring agents to ﬁnd the equilibrium of the
game, we propose that a recommended equilibrium strategy proﬁle
will be published along with the mechanism; agents can then check
the recommendation to decide if it is indeed an equilibrium. We
present an algorithm for this decision problem. It is hoped that this
work could eventually contribute to interoperability in open agent
systems.
1. INTRODUCTION
Game theory is a popular tool for designing interaction protocols
for agent systems. It allows a sort of social engineering for agents;
we can design the rules of a system so that the agents will have an
incentive to reach the outcome we desire. All of this rests on the
assumption that the rules of the system and their game theoretic
properties are common knowledge amongst the agents. This is ﬁne
if we are designing a closed system, where we (the agent designer)
know the rules, and we program the agents with knowledge of the
game they will be participating in. It is currently not clear how to
extend this work to open agent systems. By “open” we mean that
foreign agents will be free enter and leave different agent systems
at will. This means that agents will need to be able to work with
previously unseen protocols. There does not yet exist any agree-
ment on a standard way in which such protocols can be speciﬁed
and published. Furthermore, it is not clear how an agent could be
given the ability to use an arbitrary published protocol; the agent
would need to be able to understand the rules and to work out a
strategy for participation. Thus our area of work is in providing
the theoretical infrastructure needed to enable game theory mecha-
nisms to be employed in open multi-agent systems. This amounts
to specifying and verifying the mechanisms in a way appropriate for
agents. In this paper we will restrict our attention to pure strategy
subgame perfect Nash equilibria in games of complete information.
Firstly, for speciﬁcation, we will need a machine readable lan-
guage in which a game theory mechanism can be written in the
form of an agent interaction protocol, and published for agents to
inspect. This would allow the workings of the protocol to be made
public so that (i) the behaviour of agents enacting the protocol can
be tested to determine if they are complying with the published
rules; (ii) agents can inspect the published speciﬁcation to deter-
mine its properties and hence their best strategy. For the machine
readable language, we propose an algorithmic representation, as it
is likely to be the most succinct way to represent most types of
games. A protocol written in this language constitutes a speciﬁ-
cation of behaviour for agents, and they can be tested for compli-
ance as in (i); however, this kind of compliance testing is relatively
straightforward and has been discussed elsewhere [4, 7, 15, 16].
Our focus will be on point (ii).
To determine the best strategy for participation, an agent should
“solve” the game to ﬁnd the equilibrium strategies. Computing
Nash equilibria is an open problem [12] and can be difﬁcult [5,
17]. The solution proposed here is to include, with the speciﬁ-
cation of the protocol, the designer’s recommended strategy; the
recommendation should of course be an equilibrium of the game.
Because trust is an issue in open systems, agents will need to ver-
ify for themselves that the published recommendation is indeed an
equilibrium. This brings us to the idea of veriﬁcation for mecha-
nisms.
Given a published game and strategy proﬁle, an agent will need
a procedure to determine if it is in his interest to follow the recom-
mended strategy. This is a much simpler problem than ﬁnding an
equilibrium from scratch. Essentially, it is the difference between
(i) checking every possible combination of values for a set of pa-
rameters, and (ii) checking every possible value of one parameter
while all others are held constant, and repeating this process for
each parameter. The ﬁrst is exponential in the number of param-
eters, while the second is polynomial. The number of parameters
here corresponds to the number of players in the game, and the pos-
sible values of each parameter correspond to the strategies agents
can play.
The main contribution of the paper is an algorithm which can
take, as input, an algorithmic representation of (i) a game and (ii) a
strategy for each agent, and decide if the strategies are a subgame
perfect Nash equilibrium of the game. It is hoped that this work
could eventually contribute to interoperability in open agent sys-
tems, allowing agents to participate in foreign institutions and to
understand the rules there.
Section 2 describes the syntax and program semantics of SMPL
(Simple Mechanism Programming Language), a machine readable
language for publishing both games and strategies. In section 3.1
we build on this program semantics, and deﬁne the game repre-
sented by an SMPL program. Section 4 shows how subgame per-
fect Nash equilibrium can be deﬁned and presents the algorithmfor deciding if a published strategy proﬁle is an equilibrium of a
published game. Section 5 looks at related work, and Section 6
concludes with a discussion of the limitations of the work and di-
rections for future work.
2. SMPL: SIMPLE MECHANISM
PROGRAMMING LANGUAGE
This section presents the syntax and semantics for SMPL (Sim-
ple Mechanism Programming Language). It is copied from the
Simple Programming Language (SPL) of Manna and Pnueli [9],
with some modiﬁcations. We do not directly give a semantics to
SMPL in terms of games; instead we ﬁrst describe a standard pro-
gram semantics for SMPL, in terms of the sequences of states it
could produce, then in the next section (Section 3) we use the pro-
gram semantics to describe the game represented by the SMPL pro-
gram. SPL was chosen as the basis for our approach for two rea-
sons: ﬁrstly it is a theoretical language, and hence extremely simple
(as opposed to using Java, for example); secondly, it was originally
designed for specifying reactive systems, hence it is well adapted
to modular speciﬁcation, where it is important to keep track of the
communications passed between each module, and the variables
local to each particular module. Space constraints force the pre-
sentation here to be terse; a reader not familiar with this style of
semantics may wish to consult the original. To help the reader to
get a feel for the language, Figure 1 gives a very simple example
of an SMPL program describing the classic prisoners’ dilemma in-
volving two agents and the principal, as in the following normal
form representation:
1 (Cooperate) 2 (Defect)
1 (Cooperate) −1,−1 −6,0
2 (Defect) 0,−6 −3,−3
The messages exchanged are simple integers. Agent 1 chooses an
integer, 1 or 2, and sends it to the principal. The principal reads
input channel αP,1, storing the result in the variable plyr1. He then
informs agent 2 that it is his turn, reading agent 2’s action into
plyr2. Finally the utilities are calculated and sent to the special
channel αU,P.
2.1 SMPL Syntax
A program has the following syntax:
P ::

Ag1 ::

declaration;[`1: S1;ˆ `1:]

k ...
k AgP ::

declaration;[`P: SP; ˆ `P:]


It consists of a number of modules representing each of the agent
processes. Each Agi is an identiﬁer for an agent in the game and
each Si is a statement which may itself be composed of other state-
ments. Label `i is the location of part of the program control vari-
able just before execution of the statement Si, and ˆ `i is its location
just after. It is required that the module of exactly one agent will
begin with a choose statement. The ﬁnal agent (AgP above) has a
special status and is known as the principal; no choose statements
may appear in his module.
A declaration is a sequence of declaration statements with the
following syntax:
< own in|own out|local > variable, ...,variable: type where ϕi
Statements in the program may only refer to variables declared in
the declaration. Initial values for variables may be speciﬁed by the
optional assertion where ϕi. Keyword local is for variables used
by this program, not accessible to any other agent. Keywords own
Ag1 ::


local a : integer where a = 0
own out αP,1 : channel [1..] of integer

`0: choose a 1..2;`1: α1,P ⇐ a : `2





Ag2 ::






local b : integer where b = 0
own in α2,P : channel [1..] of integer
own out αP,2 : channel [1..] of integer

m0 : await|α2,P| > 0;
m1 : choose b 1..2;m2 : αP,2 ⇐ b : m3







 
AgP ::



 







 







 


local plyr1,plyr2: integer where
plyr1 = plyr2 = 0
own in αP,1,αP,2 : channel [1..] of integer
own out αU,P,α2,P: channel [1..] of integer




 







 


p0 : await|αP,1| > 0;p1 : αP,1 ⇒ plyr1
p2 : α2,P ⇐ 0;
p3 : await|αP,2| > 0;p4 : αP,2 ⇒ plyr2
p5 : if plyr1 = 1 ∧ plyr2 = 1
then p6 : αU,P ⇐ h−1,−1i
p7 : if plyr1 = 1 ∧ plyr2 = 2
then p8 : αU,P ⇐ h−6,0i
p9 : if plyr1 = 2 ∧ plyr2 = 1
then p10 : αU,P ⇐ h0,−6i
p11 : if plyr1 = 2 ∧ plyr2 = 2
then p12 : αU,P ⇐ h−3,−3i : p13





 







 







 






 









Figure 1: A simple game of two agents playing prisoners’
dilemma.
in and own out are for asynchronous communication channels for
input and output respectively. A channel is a variable whose value
is a list of integers. We identify channel variables as follows: αi,j
will be an input channel for agent i and an output channel for agent
j; i.e. only agent i can read from this channel, and only agent j
can write to it. Each non-principal agent i must have an output
channel αP,i to send messages to the principal; agent i may also
have an input channel αi,P on which to receive messages from the
principal. Finally, the principal must have a special channel αU,P
which he can write to once at the end of the game, to determine
the utility received by all agents. There are no other channels. We
allow no communication channels between other individual agents;
everything must go through the principal. This is because we need
to have a global history of the game to uniquely identify a game
state, and that will come from all of the messages received by the
principal.
Basic Statement Description
u := e assignment: assign value e to variable u
choose u c1..c2 choose a value in the interval for variable u
await c wait for Boolean expression c
α ⇐ e send expression e on channel α
α ⇒ u receive on channel α and store in variable u
if c then S1 conditional statement
else S2
if c then S1 one branch conditional statement
S1;...;Sk concatenation: sequential execution
while c do S repetition of s
Statements may be basic or compound. A compound statement
is enclosed in parentheses [...] when it is a sub statement of a larger
statement except when the compound statement has a line to itself.
Sub statements within concatenation statements are separated by
semicolons which we omit if there is a line break.2.2 SMPL Program Semantics
The semantics are deﬁned via a transition system. The transi-
tion system has variables corresponding to the program’s variables,
and it has transitions which describe how those variables change
as program statements are executed. The program will identify a
transition system, and the transition system will deﬁne the possible
sequences of states it could produce. Thus the semantics of a pro-
gram is given in terms of possible sequences of states (of variables)
it could produce.
A program identiﬁes a unique transition system hV,Θ,T i. The
variables come from a universal set of typed variables V, called
the vocabulary. From this we can construct expressions (such as
x + 3y + 4), atomic formulae (such as (x + 3y) > 7) and Asser-
tions (such as x > y ∧ y < 4). A state s is an interpretation of V,
assigning each variable u ∈ V a value s[u] over its domain. V ⊆ V
is the set of system variables: one of these is the control variable π
which represents the location of the next statement to be executed,
the remainder represent program variables. π is an (n + 1)-tuple,
where n is the number of agents in the program (+1 for the prin-
cipal); π has one part of its tuple to point to the location within
each agent’s module. The initial condition Θ is a conjunction of all
initial values for variables (appearing in where clauses), an empty
value for all channels (α = λ) and the control variable equal to
the set of entry locations for each agent. If a state s of the system
satisﬁes the assertion Θ, then it is a state from which the system
can start running. T is a set of transitions including one transition
corresponding to each statement in the program, as follows. Note
that primed values refer to the value in the successor state, and the
• symbol is used to add an element to one end of a list; for example
α
0 = α • e means that the value of α in the successor state will be
equal to what it was previously, but with e appended to the end.
SMPL Statement Transition Relation
u := e m(`, ˆ `) ∧ u
0 = e ∧ p(Y − {u})
choose u c1..c2 m(`, ˆ `) ∧ p(Y − {u}) ∧
c2 W
c=c1
u
0 = c
await c m(`, ˆ `) ∧ c ∧ p(Y )
α ⇐ e m(`, ˆ `) ∧ α
0 = α • e ∧ p(Y − {α})
α ⇒ u m(`, ˆ `) ∧ |α| > 0∧
α = u
0 • α
0 ∧ p(Y − {u,α})
if c then `1: S1 [m(`,`1) ∧ c ∧ p(Y )] ∨
[m(`, ˆ `) ∧ ¬c ∧ p(Y )]
if c then `1: S1 [m(`,`1) ∧ c ∧ p(Y )] ∨
else `2: S2 [m(`,`2) ∧ ¬c ∧ p(Y )]
while c do [`1: S ` :] [m(`,`1) ∧ c ∧ p(Y )] ∨
[m(`, ˆ `) ∧ ¬c ∧ p(Y )]
This assumes that ` is the statement’s label and ˆ ` its post-label.
The abbreviation m(`, ˆ `) means a move of control from location
` to location ˆ `; i.e. the part of π which now points to ` will sub-
sequently point to ˆ `, and all other parts of π remain the same. The
abbreviation p(U) means that all variables in the set U are not
changed by this transition. Y is the set of non control variables,
so V = {π} ∪ Y . Each transition maps each state onto a set of
possible successor states. If a transition τ maps a state s to a non-
empty set of possible successor states then τ is enabled on s, if it
maps s to the null set then the transition is disabled on state s. The
transitions in the system tell us how one state can move to the next.
A transition is taken at state s if the next state is related to s by the
transition.
Asequenceofstates(possiblyinﬁnite)s
0,s
1,s
2,s
3,... iscalled
a computation of the program P (which identiﬁes our transition
system) if s
0 satisﬁes the initial condition Θ and if each state s
j+1
is accessible from the previous state s
j via one of the transitions T
in the system. If it is a ﬁnite computation then there will be a ﬁnal
state s
n which has no successor state. A computation is a sequence
of states that could be produced by an execution of the program.
For example, playing the equilibrium path for the program of Fig-
ure 1 would produce the following sequence of states:
{h`0,m0,p0i,λ,λ,λ,λ,0,0,0,0} →
{h`1,m0,p0i,λ,λ,λ,λ,2,0,0,0} →
{h`2,m0,p0i,2,λ,λ,λ,2,0,0,0} →
{h`2,m0,p1i,2,λ,λ,λ,2,0,0,0} →
{h`2,m0,p2i,2,λ,λ,λ,2,0,2,0} →
{h`2,m0,p3i,2,0,λ,λ,2,0,2,0} →
{h`2,m1,p3i,2,0,λ,λ,2,0,2,0} →
{h`2,m2,p3i,2,0,λ,λ,2,2,2,0} →
{h`2,m3,p3i,2,0,2,λ,2,2,2,0} →
{h`2,m3,p4i,2,0,2,λ,2,2,2,0} →
{h`2,m3,p5i,2,0,2,λ,2,2,2,2} → ... →
{h`2,m3,p13i,2,0,2,h−3,−3i,2,2,2,2}
Where each state gives the values of variables in this order:
{π,αP,1,α2,P,αP,2,αU,P,a,b,plyr1,plyr2}.
Control is initially at the start of each agent’s module and channels
are empty (λ).
Given a ﬁxed decision for each agent’s choice points, an SMPL
program should produce a single computation; otherwise it is not a
valid SMPL program. This means that at any state, all the agents,
except one, should be at an await statement, or should have termi-
nated. This restriction ensures that we have a unique history of the
system corresponding to a single state of the game. Furthermore, a
valid SMPL program must have no inﬁnite computations; this en-
sures that all games represented by SMPL programs are ﬁnite. The
program should also have a unique start state.
3. REPRESENTING GAMES AND
STRATEGIES
This section makes use of the SMPL semantics to deﬁne the
Game represented by an SMPL program. Essentially this involves
stepping through the states of the SMPL program (as deﬁned by
the SMPL program semantics) until a choose statement is encoun-
tered, at which point a game node is created, and then the process
of stepping through the program states continues.
3.1 The Game Represented by a Program
Since each node in a game tree has a unique history of actions
taken to reach it, the tree can be represented by the set of histories.
We will use the terms node and history interchangeably. Each ac-
tion corresponds to a message sent to the principal in our case. If
we can extract the possible message histories from the SMPL pro-
gram, then we can use them to represent the game. We can also
use the messages sent and received by non-principal agents to de-
termine the history apparent to them, and hence the game nodes
which they cannot distinguish (information sets).
A history tuple H in a system of n agents (+principal) is a tuple
hh0,h1,... ,hni where h0 is the global history: an ordered list
of the messages received by the principal, and each other hi is the
communication history apparent to agent i; i.e. an ordered list of
the messages sent and received by i. We will refer to individual
elements hi as H[i].
Let takeTransition describe an interpreter function; it takes in
an SMPL program state and an SMPL program and it returns the
state reached after taking a single transition. This can be used to
perform any transition in the system except for the transition cor-# algorithm: runGame runs the SMPL program
# inputs: prog: program
# outputs:s: terminal state, h0: terminal node,
Inf : information set data
hs,m,A,Hi := initialState(prog)
Inf := {hm,H[m],H[0],Ai}
repeat
select a ∈ A # nondeterministic selection
hs,m,A,Hi := takeAction(s,m,a,H,prog)
Inf := Inf ∪ {hm,H[m],H[0],Ai}
until terminal(s,prog) = True
return hs,H[0],Inf i
Figure 3: Algorithm: runGame
responding to a choose statement, because the transition system
has no way to know what action an agent has taken. The algo-
rithm takeAction (Figure 2) handles the agent’s choice, updating
the system variable appropriately; it then steps through the transi-
tions using takeTransition, until it meets a choose transition, at
which point it stops and returns the current system state, the his-
tory, and the identity of the agent who needs to choose. The al-
gorithm additionally updates histories every time a communication
statement is about to be executed. If it is something read by the
principal then it is added to P’s history H[0], and also the sender’s.
If it is something read by another agent i then it is only added to i’s
history H[i].
Note that because we are writing an algorithm to interpret an-
other program, we have two sets of variables. To avoid confusion,
variables describing the state of the program prog will be preﬁxed
by “s.” for example s.u means the variable u within the program
prog. Variables without preﬁxes are part of our algorithm, and not
prog.
The terminal function returns True if the state passed as the
ﬁrst parameter is a terminal state of the program passed as the sec-
ond parameter; it returns False otherwise. A terminal state is one
where no location in the control variable is pointing to a choose
statement, and no transition is enabled; i.e. the program is not wait-
ing for any agent to make a choice.
Figure 3 shows a tiny algorithm that runs the game to ﬁnd the
global histories and apparent histories produced by all possible
computations. The only reason for not putting this together with
the previous algorithm is that we want to use takeAction alone
later. This algorithm includes nondeterministic choice, so it can
give several possible answers.
The initialState function will take a game program as a param-
eter and will return a 4-tuple: s, the initial state of the game pro-
gram; m, the agent who has the move; A, the set of actions to
choose from; H, the initial history tuple H = h[],[],...,[]i. The
utility(s) function returns the utility of a terminal state s; this is a
simple matter of looking at the value of the channel αU,P, within
s.
DEFINITION 3.1. An SMPL program prog represents the fol-
lowing ﬁnite extensive form game G = hT,U,I,Mi:
• ThegametreeT istheset{h0 |hm,hm,h0,Ai ∈ Inf where
h , ,Inf i = runGame(prog)}; i.e. we take all the possi-
ble outputs from running the algorithm runGame on prog,
this means taking all possible choices for the nondetermin-
istic selection of an action; then from the 3-tuples returned,
we look at the ﬁnal Inf and we collect all the global histories
h0 that are in there. These are all the possible nodes of the
game. A node hs is a successor node of a node hp iff hp is a
preﬁx of hs and its length is one less. The set of all succes-
sors of a node is given by the function S. Nodes having an
empty set of successors are termed terminal.
• The utility function U gives the utility of a terminal node;
it is obtained by ﬁrst creating a set of tuples which relate a
terminal node to its corresponding terminal program state.
Φ = {hh0,si|hs,h0,Inf i = runGame(prog)}.
U(h0) , utility(s) where hh0,si ∈ Φ.
• The information set function I maps each nonterminal node
to the set of nodes in the same information set as it; it is
obtained by unifying all possible Inf sets.
I = {hm,hm,h0,Ai|hm,hm,h0,Ai ∈ Inf and
h , ,Inf i = runGame(prog)}.
I(h0) , {n|hm,hm,n,Ai ∈ I and hm,hm,h0,Ai ∈ I}.
• The mover function M maps each game node to the agent
who has the move at that node; it is given by M(h0) , m
such that hm, ,h0, i ∈ I.
Note that an SMPL program can only represent a game of per-
fect recall. This is because the history apparent to an agent i is used
specify agent i’s information sets. It is assumed that the apparent
history determines what game nodes agent i can distinguish be-
tween. Hence it is impossible to specify a game which would place
two nodes, with the same apparent history, in different information
sets. Neither is it possible to have the principal artiﬁcially send ex-
tra messages to agent i to make the history different; the idea of
publishing the game is that the entire SMPL program is available
for inspection by any participant, hence agent i would be aware
that the extra messages it received did not affect the game state.
Apart from this restriction, SMPL can be used to represent any
ﬁnite imperfect information game (this follows from the Turing-
completeness of SMPL).
3.2 The Strategy Represented by a Program
For a given game, a strategy σi is a function mapping each in-
formation set owned by agent i to an action. A restricted version of
the SMPL syntax can be used to write a strategy program:
strati ::


in history : array [1..] of integer;
out action : integer;
declaration; S


The program must have exactly one input (for the history) and
one output (for the action taken). As an example, the following is
the equilibrium strategy for agent 1 in the game of Figure 1.
strat1 ::


in history : array [1..] of integer;
out action : integer;
action := 2


It is rather simple because there is only one contingency in which
the agent is called on to act. Now let run denote a function that can
interpret the program passed as the ﬁrst parameter, and run it on
the input passed as the second parameter, returning the program’s
output.
DEFINITION 3.2. LettheSMPLprogramprog representagame,
and let I be the set of tuples hm,hm,h0,Ai describing its mover,
apparent history, global history and action set as in Deﬁnition 3.1.
Letstrati besomestrategyprogramsuchthatforallinputshwhere# algorithm: takeAction returns the program state after an agent makes a choice
# inputs: s: state, m: mover, a: action, H: history tuple, prog: program
# outputs: s: resultant state, n: mover, A: actions available, H: history tuple
`0:= s.π[m], where `0 points to a statement
of the form `0: choose u c1..c2 `1:
and u is a state variable of s
let s.u := a # Set value of state variable u to action a.
let s.π[m] := `1: # mth component of s.π to point to `1:
repeat # At this point exactly one transition is enabled
if The enabled transition relation contains # (we never have more than one enabled,
an atomic formula of the form # one is always enabled after a choose)
αP,i = u
0 • α
0
P,i # Note: all these variables belong to s.
where i is some agent and P is the principal.
then H[0] := H[0] • s.u
0 # Update global and apparent histories
H[i] := H[i] • s.u
0 ﬁ # with action received by Principal
if The enabled transition relation contains
an atomic formula of the form
αi,P = u
0 • α
0
i,P # Update apparent history
then H[i] := H[i] • s.u
0 ﬁ # with action received by i
s := takeTransition(s,prog)
until s has no successor state
if terminal(s,prog) then A := {}
else n:= the positive integer such that # Now one of the locations in s.π
s.π[n] points to a statement # must point to a choose statement.
of the form choose v d1..d2
A := {a|a is an integer in the range d1..d2} ﬁ
return hs,n,A,Hi
Figure 2: Algorithm: takeAction
hi,h,n,Ai ∈ I: strati terminates
1 andrun(strati,h) ∈ A. Then
we say that strati, describes a strategy σi for agent i in the game
represented by prog, where for each node n in the game tree such
that hi,h,n,Ai ∈ I :
σi(I(n)) = run(strati,h).
A proﬁle of strategies is represented by Strat = hstrat1, strat2,
... stratci, where c is the number of agents; it is a tuple of strat-
egy programs, one for each agent. We will refer to the individual
elements as Strat[i].
4. VERIFYING SUBGAME PERFECT
NASH EQUILIBRIA
The following is the standard deﬁnition of a SPNE [2]. It is ﬁrst
necessary to deﬁne an NE. Strategy proﬁle σ is a NE if, for all
players i,
ui(σi,σ−i) ≥ ui(si,σ−i) for all si ∈ Si
ui(...) the utility obtained by agent i if the strategies ...are
played in the game.
σi the strategy in σ which is to be played by agent i.
σ−i the strategies in σ which are to be played by all
other players (not player i).
Si the set of possible strategies for agent i.
Strategy proﬁle σ is a SPNE if the restriction of σ to G is a NE
of G for every subgame G. A subgame is any branch of the game
tree which starts at a singleton information set and does not cut any
information set.
We now look at an alternative deﬁnition in our framework, and
then prove its equivalence. We extend the domain of the utility
9
1This of course makes the language of strategy programs unde-
cidable, but there should be no problem in determining that cases
of practical interest are in the language.
function U to all nodes of the game tree. For a nonterminal node n,
U(n) = U(n • σ(I(n))); i.e. n’s utility is the same as the utility
of the successor node reached by taking the action recommended
by the strategy proﬁle. An agent i’s utility at a node n is U(n)[i];
if all agents follow σ, then this is the utility this agent can expect to
get once node n is reached. A simple inductive proof on the length
of histories shows that this is true. Take the longest histories as
the base case. Now the inductive step: if U correctly describes the
expected utility for all nodes of length l, then it must also be correct
for nodes of length l-1. This is clear because all of the successors
of an l-1 node, being of length l, have a correct U, and the U at an
l-1 node is simply copied from its successor node by σ, which is
what is expected to be played.
We deﬁne the function maxU(n) as follows: if n is terminal
then maxU(n) = U(n); if n is nonterminal then:
for i = M(n) : maxU(n)[i] = max
m∈S(n)
 
maxU(m)[i]

for i 6= M(n) : maxU(n)[i] = maxU(n • σ(I(n)))[i]
Again, the same type of simple inductive proof can show that
maxU(n)[i] is the maximum utility that agent i can expect to get,
once node n is reached, if all other agents follow the strategies σ
and agent i takes optimal actions at each node. Information sets
do not matter here because the agent knows the strategies of other
agents, so he knows exactly which node he will be at in any in-
formation set. It is possible that the value of maxU(...)[i] at two
nodes, in an information set belonging to agent i, may each be rely-
ing on different actions being taken in that set; this is not a problem
because maxU(...)[i] for the closest common ancestor will take
on the value of only the greatest of these two, and so it is a value
that really is achievable for agent i without requiring the agent to
act differently at two nodes in an information set.Requirement 1 (for strategy proﬁle σ and a game G) For all
agents i, and for all game nodes n which are the root of some
proper subgame of G (i.e. n is in a singleton information set, and
the subgame which starts there does not cut any of G’s information
sets), maxU(n)[i] ≤ U(n)[i].
CLAIM 4.1. Astrategyproﬁleσ isasubgameperfectNashequi-
librium (SPNE) for a game G iff Requirement 1 holds.
Proof The “if” part (by contradiction): Assume Requirement 1
holds, but σ is not a SPNE for G. Since σ is not a SPNE, there must
exist a proper subgame Gs of G and a strategy si, for some agent i,
such that for the restriction of si and σ to Gs, ui(si,σ−i) > ui(σ).
Let r be the root node of Gs. The value of maxU(r)[i] cannot be
less than the value of ui(si,σ−i) in the restriction to Gs, because
maxU derives from optimal actions, and these cannot be worse
than si’s actions. The value of U(r)[i] is equal to the value of
ui(σ) in the restriction to Gs, hence maxU(r)[i] > U(r)[i], vio-
lating Requirement 1 (contradiction). The “only if” part (by con-
tradiction): Assume σ is a SPNE for G, but Requirement 1 does
not hold. If Requirement 1 does not hold then there is some agent i
and node d, where d is the root of Gs, a proper subgame of G, such
that maxU(d)[i] > U(d)[i]. We simply build a restricted strategy
si (restricted to Gs) which takes actions which will result in utility
maxU(n)[i] from any node n in Gs (given that opponents are fol-
lowing σ−i). Now, taking restrictions to Gs: ui(si,σ−i) > ui(σ),
violating the requirements for SPNE (contradiction). 
4.1 An Algorithm for Checking a SPNE
We need to build the game tree by running through its program
for all possible choices. Then we can do a simple backwards induc-
tion to calculate U and maxU at all nodes, and hence determine if
Requirement 1 is violated anywhere. The only potentially tricky bit
is how to recognise proper subgames. This can be done during the
backwards induction phase; we deﬁne a common ancestor function
ca(n) as follows: if n is terminal then ca(n) = n; if n is non-
terminal then ca(n) is the node which is a preﬁx of every node in
I(n) and for all s ∈ S(n), n must be a preﬁx of ca(s) too. Note
that a node is a preﬁx of itself. It is easy to see that, for any node
n, if n = ca(n) then n is the root of a proper subgame. To see
this note that if n is the preﬁx of every node in I(n) then it is a
singleton information set. Also, for any node p which is on a path
descending from n in the tree, if p had an information set which
included nodes not on a path descending from n in the tree, then
ca(p) would precede n in the tree, and the ca value for any ancestor
of p would have to be ca(p) or an ancestor of ca(p).
The checking algorithm (Figure 4) has as inputs the SMPL pro-
gram prog which deﬁnes the game, and the strategy tuple Strat
which deﬁnes the strategy proﬁle. In order to do the checking, it
will build a tree, which is a set of nodes. Each node is a 5-tuple:
hm,hm,h0,A,Ui, m is the agent who has the move at this node;
hm is the history which is apparent to the agent who has the move
(this is important to determine information sets); h0 is the global
history; A is the set of actions available to agent m; U records the
utility obtained if the path proceeding from this node is followed,
by taking the actions recommended by the strategy proﬁle.
Firstly we build the tree T, using the recursive algorithm exp−
andBranch (Figure 5). Next we create a new set of nodes T
p with
extendedinformation; thesenodeshavetheformhh0,U,maxU,cai.
Using these we propagate the U, maxU and ca values up the tree,
annotating nodes of T
p from the bottom up, because nodes higher
up the tree derive their utility from their descendants. Once we
build a new node of T
p we can discard its successors as they will
no longer be needed (each node has a unique direct predecessor).
# algorithm: expandBranch build the tree
# inputs: s: state, m: mover, A: actions,
H: history tuple, prog: program
# outputs: Nodes
Nodes := {}
for each a ∈ A do
hs,m,A,Hi := takeAction(s,m,a,H,prog)
if terminal(s,prog) = True
then U := utility(s)
else U := null
SuccNodes := expandBranch(s,m,A,H,prog)
Nodes := Nodes ∪ SuccNodes
ﬁ
node := hm,H[m],H[0],A,Ui
Nodes := Nodes ∪ {node}
od
return Nodes
Figure 5: Algorithm: expandBranch
If n is its own common ancestor, then n is the root of a proper
subgame; for such nodes we check if maxU exceeds U.
The getAll(S,t) function returns all elements of set S which
match the template t; it returns null if there are none. Similarly,
getAny(S,t) function returns one element, it is used when only
oneelementofsetS willmatcht. ThecommonAncestor(ca1,ca2)
function returns the longest common preﬁx of ca1 and ca2, which
may turn out to be one of the input arguments.
CLAIM 4.2. For an input SMPL program prog, which repre-
sents a game G, and a tuple of strategies Strat, which represent a
strategy proﬁle σ, Algorithm checkSPNE correctly decides if σ is
a SPNE for G.
Proof Sketch (by induction on the length of nodes, for the main
repeat loop) We must show that for each node n in the game: n
is assigned the correct values of U(n), maxU(n) and ca(n). it is
simple to show that this is true for the longest nodes in the game,
because they are all terminal nodes. Then we show that if this is
true for nodes of length l, it is also true for nodes of length l+1.
Some nodes of length l+1 may again be terminal; for any node n
among the remainder, it is clear that all elements of S(n) are in
T
p because they are length l+1 and hence they were added there
in a previous iteration of the repeat loop. Using those nodes it is
straightforwardto seehownisassigned thecorrectvaluesofU(n),
maxU(n) and ca(n). The ﬁrst for loop gets the common ancestor
with each element of I(n), note that these are retrieved from the
complete tree T, and not T
p, so all nodes are present. The second
for loop gets the common ancestor with the common ancestor of
each element p ∈ S(n). This time the nodes are retrieved from
T
p, so they are annotated with U(p), maxU(p) and ca(p), and
these utility values are used to calculate U(n) and maxU(n). A
special case is maxU(n)[m] where m = M(n), this must be the
best of all the maxU(p)[m]. 
The complexity of checking depends very much on the game; let
us consider the case of a multi-stage game with observed actions,
where there are p players, with a actions to choose from, and m
stages. The number of terminal nodes is a
pm; to ﬁnd each of these,
and their utilities, will require the SMPL program to be run each
time (although not always from the beginning). Thus it is clearly
only feasible for games with small numbers of players and stages.
None of these terminal nodes can be neglected, because if any has
a utility higher than all other plays of the game, then any strategy
proﬁle which does not achieve it could not be a SPNE. For this# algorithm: checkSPNE decides if a strategy proﬁle is a SPNE of a game
# inputs: prog: the program that is the mechanism, Strat: the strategy proﬁle
# outputs: True or False
hs,m,A,Hi := initialState(prog) # get the initial state of the game’s program
T := expandBranch(s,m,A,H,prog) # T is the entire tree
T
S := sortLongestFirst(T) # T
S will be a list of nodes
T
p := {} # for nodes with extended information
repeat # repeat for each node in the tree
hm,hm,h0,A,Ui := head(T
S);T
S := tail(T
S) # pull the head off
ca := h0;bestUtil := 0 # start with common ancestor = this node
if U 6= null # if it is terminal
then maxU := U
else # get its information set and common ancestor
Iset := getAll(T,h ,hm, , , i) # get all nodes with same apparent history
for each node ∈ Iset do # every node in information set
h , ,hist, , i := node # we want the history of each node ∈ Iset
ca := commonAncestor(ca,hist) # to ﬁnd the common ancestor
od
for each a ∈ A do # every action that can be taken
succNode := getAny(T
p,h(h0 • a), , , i) # get extended information for successor nodes
T
p := T
p \ {succNode} # we no longer need the extended information
h ,maxUs,Us,casi := succNode # get utilities and common ancestor of successor nodes
ca := commonAncestor(ca,cas) # common to our current node and the successor node
if a = run(Strat[m],hm) # was this successor node recommended?
then U := Us;maxU := maxUs # then propagate utilities
ﬁ
if maxUs[m] > bestUtil
then bestUtil := maxUs[m]
ﬁ
od
maxU[m] := bestUtil
if (h0 = ca) ∧ (maxU[m] > U[m]) # h0 = ca if it’s a proper subgame
then return False
ﬁ
ﬁ
T
p := T
p ∪ {hh0,U,maxU,cai} # this will be a successor node for the next iteration
until T
S = [ ]
return True
Figure 4: Algorithm: checkSPNEreasonwearelookingintoweakerequilibriumnotions, wheresome
portions of the tree can be neglected.
5. COMPARISONWITHRELATEDWORK
This paper has a similar motivation to previous work [6], but a
different approach. Firstly, the previous work did not tackle the
issue of enabling agents to check the properties of published spec-
iﬁcations for themselves; instead it proposed an ofﬂine veriﬁcation
which would be carried out by the agent protocol designer. How-
ever, agents in open e-commerce systems might not necessarily
trust the protocol designer, and furthermore, we envisage scenar-
ios where agents themselves could generate protocols on the ﬂy,
tailored for a speciﬁc auction scenario, for example. This means
agents need to be able to check the properties of a published speci-
ﬁcation for themselves. The second major difference is that the pre-
vious work proposed that the mechanism be speciﬁed in the form
of a mapping from strategy proﬁles to outcome scenarios; this is
infeasible for all but the most simple of mechanisms; for exam-
ple, if there are n agents with m strategies each, then there will
be m
n strategy proﬁles, and each agent’s strategy could itself re-
quire an unwieldy representation. Worst of all, even extremely sim-
ple games can have an astronomical number of possible strategies.
This is why we have moved to an algorithmic representation for
mechanisms.
The work of Marc Pauly [13] has had a major inﬂuence on our
approach. Pauly also has explicit choice statements as part of the
syntaxofhisMechanismProgrammingLanguage(MPL).Heproves
game-theoretic properties for 2-player games using correctness as-
sertions, via an extension of Hoare’s calculus. The main advantage
of Pauly’s approach is that it offers the possibility of verifying large
games without needing to construct the entire tree; the advantage
of our algorithmic checking approach is that it offers the possi-
bility of agents checking mechanisms automatically. Two further
differences relate to preferences and information sets. Pauly incor-
porates explicit preferences in the veriﬁcation framework; this is
absent in our framework. On the other hand, our framework al-
lows games with arbitrary information sets; Pauly’s is restricted to
games of “almost-complete” information, i.e. where the only non-
singleton information sets are those resulting from simultaneous
moves. Preferences and information sets are closely related when
one considers our intended future application to auctions; incom-
plete information games can be modeled as imperfect information
games, and hence we need information sets to obscure the knowl-
edge of other agents’ preferences.
In another paper Pauly and Wooldridge [14] do take an auto-
matedmodelcheckingapproachtothemechanismveriﬁcationprob-
lem, and set forth their vision for how this approach can contribute
to the mechanism design problem of game theorists. The paper
shows, as an example, how a voting mechanism can be formalised
and checked to see if a coalition of agents can force a deadlock in-
deﬁnitely. It would be interesting to investigate how the checking
of equilibria could be performed through ATL formulae. The main
difference between that paper, and ours, is with respect to the moti-
vation. PaulyandWooldridgeaimtocontributetotheareaofmech-
anism design by providing computing tools which can make mech-
anism speciﬁcations unambiguous, reveal hidden assumptions and
automate the process of proving that the mechanisms possess de-
sired properties. In contrast, our proposal aims to contribute to
multi-agent systems; we aim not to design new mechanisms, but
to make existing ones useful to agents in open systems, by giv-
ing agents a way of checking the properties of a previously unseen
game speciﬁcation.
Apartfromtheabovework, thereappearstobeverylittleworkin
the area of verifying properties of games. There is however related
work in the area of specifying and solving games, and also in the
area of specifying protocols for multi-agent systems. This work
will be reviewed brieﬂy now.
5.1 Specifying Games
Although their motivations are different to ours, a number of re-
lated works illustrate various different ways in which games can
be speciﬁed. Gambit [10] can automatically compute the equilibria
of games, and it allows games to be represented in extensive form
or normal form. The GAMUT [11] software has the capability to
generate a wide variety of games, where Java classes are written
to encode each type of game; The software also has the ability to
output games in a form readable by Gambit. Gala [8] uses an inno-
vative declarative language for representing and solving imperfect
information games; this allows the rules of the game to be spec-
iﬁed, and removes the need to explicitly represent each possible
game state. This language is based on Prolog, and, similar to our
own, it includes choose statements at choice points, and is deter-
ministic if all choices are speciﬁed. Of the above approaches, the
Gala language appears to be the most promising for games with
extremely large numbers of possible states.
5.2 Specifying Agent Communication
Protocols
In the area of agent communication there are a number of ap-
proaches which are sufﬁciently general to capture arbitrary games,
for example Electronic Institutions [1, 3] or Commitment Proto-
cols [18]. These works are concerned with facilitating agent com-
munication at a high level, via the speciﬁcation of protocols us-
ing notions such as norms and commitments. These approaches to
agent communication, and other similar proposals, are sufﬁciently
generic to allow the speciﬁcation of arbitrary games; one can spec-
ify a game by specifying what agents are allowed to do at each
protocol state. While it would be possible to specify our games in
these terms, it would add a signiﬁcant overhead; we have instead
opted for a language which speciﬁes only the essential information
and hence represents games as simply as possible.
6. DISCUSSIONANDFUTUREDIRECTIONS
This paper opens up an interesting new area: publishing game
theory mechanisms in a machine readable format, along with a
claim about some properties of the mechanism (for example a pur-
portedequilibrium), andthenautomaticallycheckingthattheclaimed
properties do indeed hold. In the future we are interested in ex-
ploring this area and ﬁnding the limits of the approach. For sim-
ple mechanisms the approach certainly does seem feasible. The
published speciﬁcation of a game and strategy proﬁle is extremely
concise; on the downside, the entire game tree does need to be built
during the veriﬁcation, but this is similar to the exploration done by
model checkers, an approach which is currently feasible even for
very large numbers of states. The algorithm presented in this pa-
per would only be feasible with small ﬁnite domains for the values
which agents can choose, but as we extend these domains, we in-
tend to borrow techniques which have been successfully employed
by the model checking community.
Our current plan is for a generalisation of the current work to
check for Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium. This would need to take
agents’ preferences into account. We can foresee a published strat-
egy recommendation which maps preferences to strategies; i.e. in
the form of an algorithm which can provide the following type of
recommendation to an agent: “If x is your preference over out-
comes, then y is your best strategy”. In particular, we are inter-ested in applying the framework to auctions, and so facilitating the
publicationofauctionspeciﬁcationsinelectronicinstitutionswhere
trading agents are free to roam between different auction houses.
Note that verifying the equilibrium of an auction is not possible
with the current framework, because ﬁrstly preferences cannot be
speciﬁed, and secondly, in an auction we should be checking for a
Bayesian equilibrium, rather than a subgame perfect equilibrium.
Ultimately we would like to explore the space of possible mech-
anisms and their properties, to ﬁnd the limits of the approach; i.e.
to ﬁnd the boundary where the complexity of the mechanism makes
the approach advocated here infeasible. This would give valuable
information about the types of mechanisms which should be used
in scenarios with resource bounded agents.
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